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The difficulty with the chapter on Quine ("Pure 
Reference" in Referring). is that Linsky's major criti-
cism—that there is no independent criterion, or even 
sense, to the notion of referential opacity apart from 
failure of substitutivity—seems to be justified, while 
many of his arguments are not. It is sometimes difficult 
to see the forest (the validity of the principle of sub-
stitutivity) for the trees (the details of the arguments). 
The principle, as stated by Quine and quoted by 
Linsky,is "Given a true statement of identity, one of its 
two terms may be substituted for the other in any true 
statement and the result will be true." But there are 
certain familiar cases which afford exceptions to the 
principle, such as contexts of quotation, propositional 
attitude, modality, and cross-referential demonstrative 
pronouns. Quine's attempt to fortify the principle 
against these anomalies, amounts to, as Linsky says, a 
revision of the principle thusi "Given a true statement 
of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for 
the other at any referentiallv open position in a true 
statement, salva veritate."But as Linsky points out, if 
there is no separate criterion for pure reference (or 
referential transparency) the attempt is circular. The 
distinctions of pure and impure reference apparently have 
no other function but to explain substitutivity or its 
failure. That is, if we simply relinquish the principle, 
we would not need these distinctions. 
Forestalling this major question, Linsky first ex-
amines the form of the relation asserted between substi-
tutivity and reference. Is pure reference a necessary and 
sufficient condition for substitutivity? Is it first, 
then, a necessary condition?—given substitutivity, does 
it always follow there is an Instance of pure reference? 
Linsky offers several counter-examples. The first is the 
pair, "'Cicero* is a designation for Cicero" and "'Tully' 
is a designation for Cicero," where we have ostensibly a 
case of substitutivity without pure reference of the names 
"Cicero" and "Tully." 
It seems possible to build an argument for Quine against this example. In "Reference and Modality" he says, 
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an expression which consists of another expres-
sion between single quotes constitutes a name of 
that other expression! and it is clear that the 
occurrences of that other expression or a part of 
it, within the context of quotes, iB not in gen-
eral referential. In particular, the occurrence 
of the personal name within the context of quotes 
in (4) ["'Cicero' contains six letters."] is not 
referential, not subject to the substitutiv!ty 
principle. The personal name occurs there merely 
as a fragment of a longer name which contains, 
besides this fragment, the two quotation marks. 
To make a substitution upon a personal name, 
within such a context, would be no more justifi-
able than to make a substitution upon the term 
'cat' within the context 'cattle'.1 
Perhaps Quine confuses the issue by speaking of 
quotation marks as a "context." If we think of quotation 
marks as a part of the name (which is precisely what he 
is claiming above), and if We adhere to the letter of the 
principle which states that one term of an identity state-
ment can be substituted for another, we can see why Quine 
says these examples are "not subject to the substltutivity 
principle." For in the case of quotation marks we are not 
substituting the terms of the identity statement, but an 
entirely new term. Thus to speak of quotation marks as a 
context is misleading—they seem to be more on a par with 
prefixes and suffixes, that is, appendages which actually 
change the term. 
Linsky's example seems compelling because it is 
apparently based on the identity statement, Cicero = 
Tully, yet if we insist that quotation marks are part of 
the name, we can say that the terms of the identity state-
ment are not those appearing in his examples. His two 
examples are not based on an identity statement (since 
'Cicero' = 'Tully' is simply false) any more than 'Cicero' 
and 'quoted' in the following sentence pairt '"Cicero* 
has six letters" and "'quoted' has six letters." These 
cases do not illustrate substitutiv!ty in the sense of 
the principle, that is, on the basis of an identity state-
ment, but are cases where the same thing can be predicated 
of different subjects. In Word anj Object2 Quine suggests 
that the entire error of quotational contexts can be eli-
minated by resorting to Tarski's method of spelling. 
But Quine himself works against this consistent 
interpretation of what he says above regarding the func-
tion of single quotes by continuing* 
It would not be quite accurate to conclude that 
an occurrence of a name within single quotes is 
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never referential. Consider the statements (6) 
'Giorgione played chess* is true, (7) *Giorgione' 
named a chess player, each of which is true or 
false according as the quotationless statement 
(8) Giorgione played chess» is true or false. 
Our criterion of referential occurrence makes 
the occurrence of the name 'Giorgione' in (8) 
referential, and must make the occurrences of 
'Giorgione' in (6) and (7) referential by the 
same token, despite the presence of single quotes 
in (6) and (7).5 
If we must relinquish our first attempt to defend 
Quine, at least this shows that he considers such cases 
to be referential precisely because substitutivity does 
hold, and Linsky's example is not a refutation. 
Linsky's second example is "'Cicero* / with Cicero," 
(surely he means "'Cicero* / Cicero"?) v/here anything can 
be substituted in the quotes but would not be purely ref-
erential precisely because it is in quotes. We could 
write this off as one of the exceptions which Quine con-
siders referential even though it is in quotes. But we 
can be more explicit by showing that in this case again 
we lack an identity statement—there is not even an at-
tempt to give one. This is another instance which is not 
subject to the principle, but shows that something can be 
predicated of many things. 
Another counter-example is based on the identity 
statement, "King of France = most frequently cited exam-
ple of a non-existent object." Here Linsky makes the 
the legitimate substitution in'"Charles de Gaulle is not 
the king of France," but claims that."the king of France" 
is not purely referential because its object does not 
exist. 
Quine seems to make an explicit distinction between 
naming and referential occurrences when he discusses quan-
tification in "Reference and Modality"i "Yet it is a 
principle only by courtesy. It holds only in the case 
where a term names and, furthermore, occurs referentially. 
It is simply the logical content of the idea that a given 
occurrence is referential."4 In some of his works it seems 
as though it is naming for Quine that requires an existent 
object, (e.g., Methods of Logic Ch. 33, "Existence and 
Singular Inference") If there is no object, the term 
fails to name—it merely purports to name. (Quine thus 
seems to be assuming exactly the distinction which Linsky 
insists upon in his discussion of Strawson.5) We could 
say on the basis of the above that while 'Cerberus' may 
sometimes occupy a purely referential position, it can 
never name. Yet in Word and Object he says 
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Finally, independently of all such technicali-
ties, there is just something wrong about admit-
ting that "Pegasus" can ever have purely refer-
ential position in truths or falsehoodsj for the 
intuitive idea behind "purely referential posi-
tion" was supposed to be that the term is used 
purely to specify its object for.the rest of the 
sentence to say something about. 6 
And in a footnote in Word and Object Quine says 
But note that this use of "name" [applied to 
"simple" singular terms capable of being re-
parsed as general terms] is akin to the use in 
grammar of "proper name." In some writings I 
have used "name" rather in the sense of "that 
which names"—an extragrammatical sense implying 
existence of a named object. Hochberg, "The 
ontological operator," pp. 253f., wrongly assumes 
that I equate the latter or referential sense of 
namehood with the grammatical one.7 
At any rate it seems clear that despite the distinc-
tion made in "Reference and Modality," Linsky is correct 
in saying that for Quine terms are not purely referential 
if objects are non-existent. Why this has to be the case 
will be suggested later. 
Linsky's final example is in contexts of modality, 
specifically in "N(9^ ?)." Quine, in "Reference arid Mo-
dality"** holds that 9" has impure reference because sub-
stitutivlty fails when we use an identity statement such 
as "the number of the planets = 9 . " Linsky claims that 
if it has impure reference in "N(9>7)" surely it must 
also in "N( 9 > 7 ) " and its true counterpart ,'-N( 9 > 7 ) . , , 
The latter remains true under any replacement of "9" by 
any other name for 9. This is another apparent case of 
substitutivity without pure reference. 
Although this is one of the classic examples for 
illustrating the problems of substitutiv!ty, I wonder 
about the validity of identity statements such as "9 = 
the number of planets" or even "Scott = the author of 
Waverly." Frege examines three possibilities of what an 
identity statement could bet (1) a relation between the 
object designated, thus expressing a relation of a thing 
to itselfi (2) a relation between the Bigns or names of a 
thing, such that they both designate the same objectj 
(3) a relation between the "senses" or perhaps informa-
tional content of the two, such that they both designate 
the same object. Frege was interested in the latter be-
cause it represented synthetic identity statements—two 
"aspects" or approaches toward the same object, which 
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were not merely conventional. But this does not mean the 
other two kinds are not also true identity statements. 
We often come across examples of the other two in discus-
sions of substitutivity, as (1) Scott = Scott, (2) Cicero 
= Tully. An example of (3) would be "the Morning Star 
the Evening Star." In all these examples, the signs on 
both sides of the identity sign are of the same kind. In 
the first, there is the same name, in the second, two 
different nameoj in the third, two different descriptions. 
Names and descriptions are traditionally lumped to-
gether as referring expressions, but it seems to me they 
can never be members of the same identity statement with-
out the possibility of a kind of equivocation, because 
they have different primary functions. A name primarily 
designates or refers, and further is purely conventional, 
while a description normally predicates—that is, it tells 
us something about the referent. In Kantian terms, it 
adds to our concept, in Fregean, it has a "sense," and 
this is contingent. Of course a name may also do so, 
v/hen it derives from a description, e.g. "de Tocqueville" 
or even "Smith" and "Miller" in their original meaning, 
but this is a secondary or vestigial feature often no 
longer functioningj and a description may also be used to 
refer, though this is a secondary function, used when 
names are wanting. This is where the trouble starts. 
In identity statements of these mixed referring 
expressions, the primary and secondary functions of the 
description are confused and application of substituti-
vity in such cases becomes an equivocation, not of mean-
ing, but of function. In the identity statement, the 
referential function operatesi thus "nine" and "the num-
ber of planets" both refer to the same object and in that 
respect are held to be identical, but such identity state-
ments can also be read as propositions with a subject 
(designated by a conventional term which refers) and a 
contingent fact predicated of it (designated by a descrip-
tion), i.e., "nine is the number of planets," or "there 
are nine planets." And when substituted in a sentence, 
the normal predicative function of the description may 
return to operate primarily. 
Let us apply this to the problem at hand, the iden-
tity statement, "9 « the number of planets" and its sub-
stitution into the true modal statement "N(9>7)," yielding 
"N(number of planets>7)" which is false. For Quine this 
is a case of impure reference because substitutivity does 
not save the truth value. 
But I maintain that if "the number of planets" re-
tains the original secondary function which it has in the 
identity statement, that 1B, as a referring expression 
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(to the number nine) then N(number of planets>7) remains 
a true statement. It is only when the identity statement 
is read a B a proposition, that is, where "the number of 
planets" functions as a contingent predicate, that the 
modal statement is falsified by substitution. But in that 
case the "identity statement" is not functioning as an 
identity statement at all, but is a disguised subject-
predicate proposition. Perhaps the confusion could be 
eliminated by writing the identity statement as 9 - the 
referent of "the number of planets" and the predicative 
statement as 9 = the number of planets. Thus N(the ref-
erent of "the number of planets">7) is true, while N(the 
number of planets>7) is false. 
This shows once more that the key to many of the 
problems of substitutivity lies in the identity statement. 
If the identity statement is genuine, that is, both terms 
function equally to refer, then substitutivity holds, and 
in Quine's terminology the occurrence of 9 in the modal 
statement is a case of pure reference—any other expression 
which functions as a referring expression for 9 may be 
substituted salva verltate (e.g., 9 = IX). Conversely, 
expressions which predicate contingent fact of the refer-
ent of a name may not be so substituted. It is not only 
the context which bears watching for cases of reference, 
but the function of terms in the identity statement. 
Linsky concludes oh the basis of these counter-
examples that the relation between pure reference and 
substitutivity is not such that the former is a necessary 
condition for the latter. I have tried to undermine his 
arguments, but even if we leave him one counter-example 
he wins his case, and the example of the non-existent 
"referent" seems to afford a case where substitutivity 
holds, but by Quine's own standards is without pure ref-
erence. 
Now Linsky turns to the reverse implication which 
seems to be the one that Quine consistently and straight-
forwardly claims, i.e., that substitutivity is a necessary 
condition for pure reference or, (the equivalent) that if 
there is failure of substitutivity there is referential 
opacity, linsky's argument is this. We assume the fol-
lowing identity to be true of Lyndon B. Johnsont "The 
person who holds the office of president of the United 
States •• the person who holds the office of chairman of 
the Harvard Philosophy Department," and the statement 
"The person who holds the office of the president of the 
United States was administered the oath of the latter 
office by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court." But 
substitutivity fails here because the demonstrative ex-
pression "the latter office" loses its correct antecedent 
reference. 
*3 
Again Linsky argues that this must be a case of pure 
reference. "Surely, I f there is such a thing as a rela-
tion of pure reference at all, the term 'the person who 
holds the office of president of the United States' stands 
in that relation to Lyndon B. Johnson."9 But Quine has 
claimed in a similar example (Giorgione = Barbarelli, and 
"Giorgione was so-called because of his size," in "Refer-
ence and Modality"!0) that because substitutivity failed, 
the terms were not purely referential. Therefore, if 
Linsky's argument is valid it must be that he is using 
some other (intuitive?) criterion for pure reference, al-
though he claims later the notion is a "logical mirage" 
or a "mere negative after-image." Perhaps the difficulty 
is that Linsky's claim of pure reference does not consi-
der whether or not this is a referentially open or opaque 
context—for it is the context which Quine is concerned 
with—not terms per se. 
If we admit Linsky's argument that substitutivity 
is not a necessary condition for pure reference, then we 
admit also some other criterion for pure reference which 
Linsky has not statedi if we admit that failure of sub-
stitutivity is the criterion for pure reference as in 
Quine's examples of Giorgione, then this cannot consti-
tute a counter-example and substitutivity is a necessary 
condition for pure reference. 
II 
But let us conceed to Linsky so that v/e may examine 
the two alternatives he gives us if we wish to maintain 
the principle of Bubstitutivity. We may first of all try 
to find another characteristic common to all these heter-
ogeneous cases of failure of substitutivity, or we may 
admit that we are in a circle and define referential 
opacity (non-extentaionality) in terms of the failure of 
substitutivity. 
The firBt alternative fails according to Linsky 
simply because there doesn't seem to be any independent 
sense to "pure reference" apart from substitutivity and 
the principle it is to explain. But LinBky overlooks an 
attempt by Quine to give some content to our "intuitive" 
notion of pure reference. In Word and Ob.iect he says, 
"In sentences there are positions where the term is used 
as a means simply of specifying its object, or purporting 
to, for the rest of the sentence to say something about, 
and there are positions where it is not,"H and later, 
"...for the intuitive idea behind 'purely referential po-
sition' was supposed to be that the term is used purely 
to specify its ob;ject for the rest of the sentence to say 
something about."12 Also, an example, "of purely referen 
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tial position is the position of singular terms under predication."13 
Is Quine suggesting the grammatical role of the 
subject of predication—at.least as a paradigm? But 
there are cases where terms are purely referential yet 
are not grammatical subjects, as in "Crassus heard Tully 
denounce Cataline," where all three names refer purely, 
yet only Crassus is the grammatical subject. Nor is it 
a sufficient condition for being purely referential, for 
in cases where the object denoted by the subject term 
does not exist, Quine holds the term to be non-referential. 
But Quine may have in mind as paradigm for pure reference 
the logical subject—or those positions which, in symbolic 
notation, are occupied by variables. So we pass'from the 
vague or intuitive notion of subject term to the putative 
precision of quantified logic. 
The claim is that in each of the cases which fail 
of substitutivity—contexts of quotation, propositional 
attitude, modality or demonstrative pronouns—quantifi-
cation produces nonsense* Linsky's counter-example is 
"Jones believed that somebody stole the jewels" inter-
preted as Jones believing that some specific, but un-
named person stole the jewels, and which Linsky quanti-
fies as (Six)(Jones believes x stole the jewels). This, 
he claims, is an example of a case of quantification 
into an opaque context (belief) which makeB perfectly 
good sense indeed. 
Quine takes pains to deal with just such cases in Word and Object. 
The need of cross-reference from inside a belief 
construction to an indefinite singular term out-
side is not to be doubted. Thus see what urgent 
information the sentence "There is someone whom 
I believe to be a spy" imparts in contrast to "I 
believe that someone is a spy." Surely therefore, 
the transparent sense of belief is not to be 
lightly dismissed.14 
But he continues to show that if we allow belief to be invariably transparent we allow more than we intend to. Thus 
in general what is wanted 1B not a doctrine of transparency or opacity of belief, but a way of indicating selectively and changeably, just what positions in the contained sentence are to shine through as referential on any particular occa-sion. 15 
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So Linsky's counter-example does not automatically 
become a case of quantification into an opaque context 
simply because of the belief context—belief for Quine 
can also be transparent. But it is just this transparency 
which is troublesome to Quine. In "Quantifiers and Pro-
positional Attitudes" 1 6 he considers (1) (3x)(Ralph be-
lieves that x is a spy) in the case where Ralph suspects 
a man in a brown hat to be a spy, not knowing that he is 
the same man (say, Bernard J. Ortcutt) he has also seen 
at the beach whom he believes to be a pillar of the com-
munity. If we consider the belief in (1) to be trans-
parent (or "relational" as Quine calls it here) which is 
the only way it makes sense, we are committed to the con-
junction (2) Ralph sincerely denies "Bernard J. Ortcutt 
is a spy" and Ralph believes that Bernard J. Ortcutt is 
a spy. 
The reasoning is apparently sot 
Bernard J. Ortcutt = the man in the brown hat 
Bernard J. Ortcutt = the man seen at the beach 
and given the premisses' 
Ralph believes the man in the brown hat is a spy. 
Ralph does not believe the man seen at the beach is 
a spy. 
together with the substitutivity allowable if we interpret 
belief here transparently, we get the seemingly paradoxi-
cal conjunction (2) above. Quine does not go so far as 
to call these statements contradictory, but he finds them 
an undesirable "oddity" and he goes to great pains to 
show that instead of (1) we have another way of quanti-
fying which gives us the relational sense wanted in (l). 
Thus he suggests (3x)(Ralph believes z(z is a spy) of x ) — 
where z(z is a spy) is the attribute spyhood. 
Yet even with this convention we end by concluding 
both (3) Ralph believes z(z is a spy) of Ortcutt and 
(4) Ralph believes z(z is not a spy) of Ortcutt, which is 
surely just as much an oddity as the original troublesome 
conjunction (2). Thus the whole project does not seem to 
be a method to avoid the peculiar results of accepting 
(3x)(Ralph believes x to be a spy) as transparent—results 
which lead Quine to relegate that form to nonsense—but 
rather a device to express the same meaning without quan-
tifying into the belief context. Indeed, the fact that 
Quine wishes to preserve the relational sense he attributes 
to (1) seems to prove the point Linsky makes, that (1) 
makes very good sense. The whole project seems to have 
no other purpose than to save the purported correlation 
between a failure of quantification into belief contexts 
46 
and the opacity of belief contexts. But this hardly seems 
necessary if he admits a transparent sense of belief to 
begin with. 
T suspect the attempt to save the parallel between 
failure of quantification and referential opacity is also 
the reason why Quine must hold that terms such as "Pega-
sus" are not purely referential. For by the criterion of 
substitutivity alone, the following ought to be perfectly 
acceptablet Since Jupiter = Jove, and "Jupiter was associa-
ted.with rain and thunder," then "Jove was associated with 
rain and thunder." But it is rather the failure of quan-
tification because of its existential implication that 
leadB Quine to reject this as purely referential. 
Linsky's solution to the "oddities" engendered by 
quantifications such as (ax)(George IV wishes to know if 
x is the author of Waverly) (i.e., "George IV wishes to 
know if Scott is the author of Waverly" as well as "George 
IV does not wish to know if the author of Waverly is the 
author of Waverly") is that both are true, and he ex-
plains the apparent paradox of their joint assertion to 
be supressed relations involved in the identity'terms in 
the scope of a verb of propositional attitude. This ap-
pears to be a fruitful, if vague, suggestion, but his pro-
posed analysis as "George IV wants to know if Scott, un-
der the designation 'Scott' is the author of Waverly" is 
subject to ambiguity, for surely George IV is not asking 
whether Scott disdained a pen name. {cf. "George IV 
wishes to know if Mary Anne Evans under the designation 
'Mary Anne Evans' is the author of Middlemarch."T But 
note that Linsky's suggestion is similar to mine in the 
case of modal contexts regarding 9 and the number of 
planets, where I suggest N(the referent of "the number of 
planets">7)» Suppose we try my suggestion and use "the 
referent of ' '" to precede descriptions in true iden-
tity statements, i.e., Scott = the referent of 'the au-
thor of Waverly'. While it is true that George IV does 
not wish to know if the author of Waverly is the author 
°f Waverly. it seems to me that George IV could wish to 
know if the referent of 'the author of Waverly' is the 
author of Waverly. without being entirely ludicrous. But 
perhaps this is also subject to ambiguity, for it could 
be interpreted as asking whether the man reputed to have 
written Waverly. really did, which is not the issue, any 
more than Scott's pen name. At least Linsky's and my 
attempts seem to show the need for a consistent distinc-
tion between the referring (or conventional) and predica-
tive (or contingent) functions of a description. 
However, the main question of Alternative I--whether 
or not failure of quantification might be another criter-
ion for pure reference seems to rest on (1) whether or not 
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Quine's alternative devices for quantifying statements 
like "Jones believes someone stole the jewels" is neces-
sary other than as an aj& hoc device to preserve the claim 
that we can't quantify into belief contexts, and (2) whe-
ther we agree that terms with no existent objects cannot 
refer. 
Alternative II in which we simply define impure 
reference in terms of failure of substitutivity fails 
according to Linsky because it cannot account for the 
invalidity of a certain kind of inference unless the 
principle is adjusted to include the notion of modality, 
specifically, logical possibilityi and Linsky claims 
this is viciously circular because logical possiblity 
is one of the contexts that are characterized as opaque. 
Linsky'a example is the argument, "Alcibiades is 
the most notorious Athenian traitor. Everyone believes 
Alcibiades is honest. Therefore, everyone believes the 
most notorious Athenian traitor is honest." 
This is invalid, Linsky claims, for it is at least 
possible that the premisses be true and the conclusion 
false. But we can't explain the invalidity on the basis 
of an illegal substitution into an opaque position in the 
second premise because that premise is false and there-
fore remains false no matter what you substitute for 
"Alcibiades." Therefore, by defintion, the context is 
transparent. 
Linsky's argument is not very clear to me, so I will 
interpret the problem my own way, which arrives, I think, 
at the same conclusion as Linsky's. Rather than charac-
terize the position as transparent because of its falsity, 
I prefer to stick to the letter of the principle, which 
only speaks of substitutivity in true statements* Thus 
it would seem the principle can't serve as a criterion at 
all for opaque positions in false statements generally, 
and would be of no help in explaining the invalidity of 
this argument. 
But since it is logically possible that the sentence 
under consideration be true, we can test it for referen-
tial opacity on the assumption that it is true. However, 
this involves another amendment of the original principle 
to this effect, "...can substitute in any referentially 
open position in a sentence which is possibly true (in 
the senBe of logical possibility)." 
Thus we arrive at the problem Linsky sees. The 
principle now employs the concept of logical possibility. 
But this is itself referentially opaque. We have, then, 
a criterion for referential opacity which includes in it 
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an instance of referential opacity. 
If my analysis of the necessity statement was cor-
rect, we could say that modal contexts are not opaque, 
but give that impression unless the terms substituted in 
them are made precise\ but even if I am wrong and we con-
cur that modal contexts are referentially opaque, is 
there a vicious circle? 
We are not defining "modality" (least of all logi-
cal possibility) by the criterion, but rather what it is 
to be referentially opaque. And opacity is not a condi-
tion for recognizing logical modalities. We define mo-
dalities in other ways (perhaps by arialyticity). So it 
is not as though we are defining one notion in terms of 
the other. Had we used quotation marks in the criterion 
it would not be circular. All this amounts to is that a 
position in the criterion would be referentially opaque, 
but I don't see that it affects the validity of the cri-
terion by making it circular. 
Linsky also discusses Quine's argument designed to 
show that in a case of referential transparency and in-
terchangeability of logical equivalents these two condi-
tions imply the truth-functionality of the statements 
(extensionality). This is logically equivalent to the 
claim that departure from extensionality, while allowing 
interchangeability of logical equivalents leads to the 
acceptance of referentially opaque contexts. Quine as-
sumes this is a good reason for maintaining extensionality. 
But Linsky asks why Quine considers the admission 
of opaque contexts a dire consequence. Quine feels they 
lead to the mistake of taking singular terms to occur in 
contexts in which they are not relevantly present from a 
logical viewpoint. But again Linsky urges that since 
there is no other pressing reason for extensionality 
other than to maintain the principle of substitutivity, 
perhaps the analysis of singular terms which is based on 
it is overly simple, while the very analysis demanded by 
referentially opaque contexts might be more illuminating. 
Ill 
The result of this long meandering seems to be that 
Linsky has shown that pure reference is not a necessary 
condition for substitutivity, so long as Quine maintains 
that terms such as 'Pegasus' do not refer, but I don't 
think he successfully counters the claim that it is a 
sufficient condition until he produces a separate cri-
terion for pure reference. But he has also pointed out 
precisely that there does not seem to be any such inde-
1*9 
pendent criterion—intuitive notions are illusory, and 
the claim of failure of quantification into opaque con-
texts does not hold unless one is determined to maintain 
a parallel by ad hoc devices. Neither does it seem to me 
that Linsky successfully counters Alternative II—the 
admittedly "circular" interpretation. 
Therefore there do not seem to be any logical rea-
sons to prevent one from maintaining the principle of sub-
stitutivity (as duly amended) and its correlative notions, 
referential opacity or transparency under Alternative II. 
The issue seems to turn on pragmatics—what is the point 
of maintaining the principle and its concepts and the ma-
chinery required if we do not get beyond their manifest 
circle. More important, might not such an adherence pre-
vent us from making more faithful and penetrating analyses 
of the complexities of natural language. As Linsky points 
out in his concluding section, the logician seems to be 
precluded from the context of speech situations, which 
includes the knowledge assumptions of both speaker and 
audience and which are so relevant in analyses of meaning. 
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